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Understanding Pension Fund 
Corporate Engagement 
Pension funds are not the new moral conscience of the twenty-first century, 
but they are significant owners of today's corporations. They are also institu-
tions that pay out retirement benefits over long periods of time. Think of the 
twenty-five-year-old worker who retires at age sixty-five and draws his pen-
sion for the next twenty years. Given the length of such commitment, pension 
funds have to carefully consider companies they invest in over a long period 
of time and be increasingly aware of the long-term risks from the environ-
mental, social and governance (ESG) factors in their investment portfolio. 
Few risks are greater than the environmental risks companies face today. 
Considering that eight of the last ten summers in the United States were the 
warmest on record (Gore 2006), it is not surprising that investors are asking 
companies how they plan to manage climate change risk over time. The same 
holds true for social risks such as exposure to conflict zones, as is the case in 
the Sudan, or the potential reputation-ruining risk Wal-Mart is facing from 
numerous employee lawsuits. Anticipation and mitigation of long-term risks 
is key to pension fund corporate engagement. A growing number of pension 
fund trustees and managers have come to believe that, in the long run, ESG 
considerations lower the risks associated with an uncertain future. They 
believe companies that behave with certain ESG ethical standards maintain, 
and even gain, value over time.1 To this end, pension funds are increasingly 
engaging companies in their investment portfolio in an effort to raise their 
ESG standards. 
Two forces converged in the late 1990s and early 2000s that strengthened the 
role of institutional investors.2 The first was their newfound willingness to act 
in coalition. The second was the combination of increasing managerial excesses 
and declining stock values. While absentee owners were seen as part of the 
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problem, renewed corporate governance and managerial oversight by share-
holders were touted as the panacea to cure the ailing markets (Deakin 2005). 
In widely held capital markets, such managerial oversight by shareholders 
is possible when large institutional investors aggregate the authority of pre-
viously dispersed beneficial owners. Pension funds are increasingly playing 
this role. 
There are two types of pension funds. One is the defined benefit (DB) plan, 
which pays the retiring plan members based on years served and salary earned. 
The other is the defined contribution (DC) plan, where retirement payments 
are based on the amount of annual contributions. These differences are 
important in determining whether a pension fund will use corporate engage-
ment.3 Pooled DB pension plans, administered by boards of trustees are able 
to act as unitary economic agents within capital markets. As a result they 
lower the transaction costs of monitoring firm-level behavior. In contrast, the 
individualized nature of DC pension plans makes such actions difficult, 
though not impossible. 
Although both types of pension funds hold significant assets ($9.4 trillion), 
DC plans are growing while DB plans are shrinking. In 1979 DB plans 
accounted for 62 percent of all U.S. pension fund participants. By 2005 that 
percentage had shrunk to 10. For DC plans (401-K plans) the numbers of par-
ticipants grew from 16 percent to 63 percent over the same period (EBRI2007). 
The same trend is evident with pension plan assets. In 1985 66 percent of 
total pension assets were held in DB plans, and 34 percent were held in DC 
plans. By 1996, DC plans held half the total pension assets. From then on DC 
plans have outpaced DB plans in both numbers and size. By 2005 DC plans 
held 61 percent of all pension plan assets (Conference Board 2007). 
In absolute terms the current assets of large, DB pension plans continue to 
dominate financial markets. Of the two hundred largest pension plans in the 
United States, 80 percent of the assets are held by DB plans (Pension and 
Investments 2007). This may well be the apex of Anglo-American, trusteed, 
defined benefit pension plans' growth and thus influence within the financial 
market. The power of these pension plans may wane in the future, but with 
assets totaling $2.7 trillion their size makes them effective in influencing firm-
level decisions. 
Within the pension fund universe, there are public sector pension funds, 
private corporate funds, and Taft-Hartley or multi-employer funds. With only 
a few notable exceptions private corporate funds do not become active owners 
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and do not use corporate engagement to raise the standards of firms in which 
they invest. In most cases these corporate-sponsored funds do not exercise 
scrutiny over other corporations, fearing that will bring the same treatment 
in return. This means a considerable amount of U.S. pension fund assets 
(close to $5 trillion) are not used for active ownership.4 
Most U.S. "activist" pension funds tend to be large DB funds in the public 
sector where these plans continue to grow. These funds increased in absolute 
size from $200 billion in 1980 to $2.7 trillion in 2005. As a share of total insti-
tutional investment, activist public employee funds rose from 7 percent to 11 
percent.5 That said, not all activist funds are drawn from this pool. TIAA-
CREF, with $437 billion (as of September 2007) assets under management for 
colleges and universities, is the best example of an activist DC private plan in 
the United States.6 
A key actor among the activist DB pension funds is the California Public 
Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), the largest U.S. DB pension fund, 
with assets totaling $245 billion as of June 2007. CalPERS and other activist 
pension funds are leading the attempt to shift power away from corporate 
managers back to shareowners.7 This book traces CalPERS' corporate engage-
ment strategies beginning with its activist stance on corporate governance in 
the 1980s through 2007. 
Activist pension funds are shifting the power dynamic between owners and 
managers. In the past, the cost of corporate engagement, when measured 
against possible gains, meant that few minority shareholders were willing to 
monitor corporate management. But today's pension funds hold such large 
stakes in individual firms that they are able to bear these costs alone and, more 
important, act in coalition with other pension funds. As a result, corporate 
engagement is a potent force in representing owners' interests in today's com-
panies. This new representation is changing the principle-agent debate (Clark 
and Hebb 2004). 
Previously owners have been widely dispersed and therefore essentially 
powerless to control corporate managers and boards (Berle and Means 1933). 
But the large holdings of pension funds and their newly found ability to form 
coalitions mean that corporate engagement is a potent force in aligning man-
agerial interests with those of shareholders. 
Such coalitions are possible because changes in securities laws allow for 
easier communication between shareholders and because transaction costs of 
both monitoring and coordinating responses have been lowered when mea-
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sured against the increases in share value such activity generates. In the past 
pension funds were deemed ineffective as corporate monitors, and were iden-
tified as "lone wolves" in their attempts to provide oversight of corporate 
decision making. In the early 1990s this tendency toward isolation was seen 
as the major drawback to pension funds' effectiveness as corporate monitors 
(see, for example, Coffee 1991,1997; and O'Barr and Conley 1992). 
Although CalPERS and other large activist pension funds are important 
individual players, it is the institutional investor coalitions that have the 
greatest opportunity to influence and engage corporate management. From 
1980 to 2005 U.S. institutional investors increased their holding of outstanding 
U.S. equities from 37 percent to 61 percent. By 2005 activist state and local 
funds held close to 10 percent of all U.S. equity. Thus when these funds act in 
coalition they wield considerable influence. 
Given their history as "lone wolves" it is little wonder we see some tensions 
in these large institutional investor coalitions. While prepared to act in coali-
tion, pension funds simultaneously seek to keep their own management costs 
as low as possible and therefore resent the "free riders" who benefit from 
increased corporate standards but do not bear the costs of the endeavor. 
"Making the interventions in the investment system that will have the max-
imum positive impact over the next decade calls for asset owners and their 
investment advisors to undertake a steep learning curve and above all, to col-
laborate far more effectively then they have to date" (Thamotheram and 
Wildsmith 2007,443). 
There is an increasing number of effective coalitions on which to model 
future action by these key actors. These new coalitions cluster around ESG 
issues. The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) representing $41 trillion in 
assets (as of February 2007), the United Nations (UN) Principles for Respon-
sible Investment (PRI) with signatories representing $8 trillion (as of April 
2007), Institutional Investors for Climate Risk, and Coalition for Environ-
mentally Responsible Economies (CERES) are four examples of effective 
coalitions working on environmental standards. The Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative and the Sudan Campaign are two examples of coali-
tions of investors focused on social issues. The Council of Institutional 
Investors and the International Corporate Governance Network are two long-
established corporate governance coalitions. All of these institutional investor 
coalitions have strong records of success in influencing companies to raise 
their standards. Most use some form of corporate engagement to achieve 
their goals. 
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At its best corporate engagement offers a long-term view of value that both 
promotes higher environmental, social, and governance standards and adds 
share value, thus providing long-term benefits to future pension beneficia-
ries. At its worst it diverts the attention of pension fund officials from their 
primary responsibility of ensuring the retirement benefits of their members, 
and encourages pension funds to usurp the rightful responsibilities of cor-
porate managers. This book examines corporate engagement and its impacts 
on firms in an effort to see how the potential from this newly emerging force 
is being realized. 
Pension Fund Power 
Pension funds and other institutional investors have been growing in size and 
influence in financial markets since the 1980s. Collectively U.S. institutional 
investors hold $24 trillion in assets and control $11 trillion in equities, roughly 
60 percent of outstanding equities in the United States (Conference Board 
2007). Of those equity holdings, pension funds hold $5 trillion, and activist 
state and local pension funds hold $2 trillion. 
In the 1980s and 1990s most pension funds behaved no differently from the 
rest of the financial market. They pushed companies to deliver a steady stream 
of quarterly earnings in order to meet standard industry benchmarks. But as 
pension funds grew, they lost their ability to sell stock when dissatisfied with 
performance (a practice known as the "Wall Street Walk"). 
Three trends directly affected the ability of pension funds to sell corporate 
stock when they were unhappy with financial or corporate performance. First, 
their sheer size meant pension funds held large equity positions that made 
them increasingly vulnerable to the performance of the market as a whole. 
This phenomenon has been dubbed the "Universal Owner" (see Hawley and 
Williams 2000 and 2007). 
Second, during the 1990s many pension funds began to use passive stock 
indexes (such as the Standard and Poor's 500) for their equity investments. As 
a result they could no longer sell stock because it was part of a broader index 
in their portfolio. The trend toward indexing grew during the 1990s with stock 
markets returning 20 percent and more on an annual basis. It became increas-
ingly difficult for active money managers to "beat" the market, particularly 
once their fees were taken into consideration. Many pension funds moved 
from active money management to passive money management in the belief 
that it is hard to pick stocks that consistently outperform the market as a whole. 
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Third, selling large holdings can result in lower stock prices, a practice that 
would run counter to pension funds' fiduciary responsibility. As Georg 
Siemens, the nineteenth-century founder of Deutsche Bank, said, "If you can't 
sell, you have to care" (cited in Monks 1995,1). 
Because these three trends are driven by pension fund size, CalPERS and 
other large pension funds took advantage of this phenomenon first. Pension 
funds realized that key to their fiduciary duty was a long-term view of value 
within their investment portfolio (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer 2005). 
CalPERS incorporated the concept of long-term value into its core Principles 
of Corporate Governance: "Corporate directors and management should have 
a long-term strategic vision that, at its core, emphasizes sustained shareowner 
value. In turn, despite differing investment strategies and tactics, shareowners 
should encourage corporate management to resist short-term behavior by 
supporting and rewarding long-term superior returns" (CalPERS 2007b). 
However, a long-term view of value remains a somewhat difficult task for 
pension funds and their money managers who still rely on quarterly earnings 
reports as indicators of "success," and in a period of declining equity pre-
miums many short-term investment practices are being utilized that are hard 
to marry with the pension funds' stated long-term investment philosophy.8 
Pension fund managers must inevitably be concerned with both short-term 
returns, as part of the benchmarking process fundamental to fiduciary duty, 
and long-term value, as expressed through raising firm-level accountability, 
transparency, social and environmental standards. 
In the past, many researchers found pension funds to be dominated by 
short-term, myopic investors whose impatience often eroded share value 
(Bushee 1998; Romano 2001; Shleifer and Vishny 1988). But these findings 
were based on short-term examinations of stochastic shocks measured around 
specific corporate announcements rather than examinations of pension fund 
investment behavior over longer time horizons (Bauer et al. 2003). 
Pension funds have been found to have a lower stock turn over rate when 
compared to other institutional investors (Brancato 1994). Other studies indi-
cate that pension fund investors value long-term investment in research and 
development as well as other capital expenditures (Jarrell et al. 1985; Majunder 
1994; Marsh 1990; McConnell and Muscarella 1985). Pension fund managers 
are prepared to reward analysts who consider environmental, social, and gov-
ernance factors in their analysis. The Enhanced Analytics Initiative (EAI) 
whose signatories manage $2.4 trillion of assets, is a good example of the trend 
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toward a long-term view of value. Signatories to the EAI commit a percentage 
of their analysts' mandates to those who use extra-financial as well as finan-
cial criteria in investment selection (Thamofheram and Wildsmith 2007). 
Pension Fund Corporate Engagement Drivers 
Pension fund corporate engagement is a legitimate use of the owners' rights 
in a company to provide oversight and protect shareholder value. But it does 
not mean that owners interfere in day-to-day management decision making. 
What activist pension funds seek from management is greater accountability 
to shareholders, greater transparency, and higher standards of corporate 
behavior. 
Corporate engagement itself can range from quiet discussions with man-
agement and the voting of proxies to more contentious approaches such as 
mounting dissident shareholder resolution campaigns and public removal of 
firms and even whole countries from investment portfolios. 
Corporate engagement does not ask companies to sacrifice long-term prof-
itability. It seeks higher corporate standards in order to reduce risk over time. 
Though such corporate standards are often referred to as corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), it is important to note that pension fund corporate 
engagement concerns itself solely with the long-term interests of shareholders. 
Although corporate engagement aligns corporate managers with share-
holders' long-term interests, CSR suggests that companies respect all their 
stakeholders including clients, employees, community, governments, sup-
pliers, and customers, as well as its shareholders. In contrast, many pension 
fund investors argue that greater regard for the long-term and increased cor-
porate social responsibility reduces risk, adds share value, and in the end 
serves shareholders' interests. 
The first driver of pension fund corporate engagement is the growing asset 
size. Large holdings alone would not be sufficient to foster corporate engage-
ment, but it would be when combined with a long-term investment horizon 
and active ownership. 
Throughout most of the 1990s, the bull market roared through the Anglo-
American financial system, reinforcing the myth of the "new economy" and 
its attendant stock market riches. The 1990s also witnessed the impact of huge 
pension fund investors who were active in financial market decisions. 
Although the power and potential influence of pension funds was present 
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through the boom, for the most part pension fund trustees and money man-
agers used their market position in very conventional ways. 
However, following the 2000 collapse of the technology, media, and 
telecommunications (TMT) stock bubble and the corporate governance scan-
dals of 2001 and 2002, there was a shift toward pension funds' need for 
long-term value. This shift is marked by two changes in investment behavior. 
The first is a shift in investment style—away from "growth" and toward 
"value" investing. The second is increased awareness among pension fund 
investors regarding their apparent short-term myopia and the prospects for a 
longer-term investment horizon necessary to realize increased share price 
from "value" investing. 
The second driver of pension fund corporate engagement is the amount 
of assets held in passive indexes that restricts pension funds' exit from com-
panies that have poor standards or are underperformers in the market. In 
1984, two hundred largest DB pension funds in the United States held only 
$50 billion in passive index funds; twenty years later this amount had grown 
to almost $800 billion (see figure 1.1). 
With the phenomenal run up of the stock market in the 1990s it became 
increasingly difficult for money managers to "outperform" the stock market. 
(N (N <N M <S d 
Fig. I.I Growth of indexed assets of the top t w o hundred 
U.S. defined benefit plans (bill ions) 
Source: Pensions and Investments (2006). 
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Consequently, many pension funds, including CalPERS, moved increasing 
amounts of assets into passively managed index funds that mirrored the 
market. The Standard and Poor's 500 Index, comprising the largest five hun-
dred companies in the United States by market capitalization, had annual 
growth rates of 20 percent during this period (see figure 1.2). However, 
owning an index fund means you must hold every company in the index. As 
a result pension funds were not able to sell stock of individual companies even 
when unhappy with their governance or financial returns. 
Corporate engagement's third driver is found in the growing evidence of 
a correlation between strong environmental, social, and governance stan-
dards, and share value outperformance (see Gompers et al. 2003, Anson et 
al. 2003). Increasingly pension fund investors look to ESG indicators as 
proxies for long-term performance. These factors are sometimes referred to 
as extra-financial as they are often not part of the required annual financial 
statements and filings. Some companies have chosen to report separately on 
these issues as part of their voluntary corporate social responsibility or CSR 
reports. Because pension funds and other institutional investors see these 
factors as bearing on risk there is increased pressure to have them included 
in the mandatory annual statements as material to companies' performance. 
Fig. 1.2 Indexed assets of the top two hundred U.S. defined benefit plans 
as a percent of U.S. market capitalization 
Source: Pensions and Investments (2006), and U.S. Government Statistics. 
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Thus, ESG issues would be part of the material disclosures in corporate 
annual reports. 
Measuring extra-financial corporate behavior used to be the domain of a 
few boutique rating agencies. But interest in these aspects of corporate behavior 
is becoming more mainstream with rating companies such as Standard and 
Poor's, Moody's and Fitch establishing metrics by which to measure corporate 
environmental, social, and governance standards of firm behavior. Not only do 
activist pension funds rely on ratings agencies for analysis of the risks from 
these extra-financial indicators for investment decision making, they also use 
rating agency reports to indicate opportunities for corporate engagement. 
The fourth driver of pension fund corporate engagement is the increasing 
amount of international equity held by pension funds (see figure 1.3). In 2005, 
the largest twenty-five U.S. pension funds held close to 14 percent of their 
assets in international equity.10 With increased international exposure, long-
term pension fund investors are becoming sensitive to the need for companies 
to conduct business in the framework of global standards. 
Equally dramatic is the increase in pension fund investment in emerging 
markets around the world where ESG risks are often greater than in more 
developed markets (see figure 1.4). 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Fig. 1.3 Growth of international equity assets of the top two hundred 
U.S. pension funds (billions) 
Source: Pensions and Investments (2007). 
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Previously, pension fund corporate engagement on international social and 
environmental concerns was limited to single issues such as the South African 
divestment campaign of the 1970s and 1980s (examined in greater length in 
chapter 2). Often these campaigns were driven by legislative demands rather 
than by the pension funds themselves. Over the past twenty years some U.S. 
state legislatures have mandated pension funds to divest from South Africa, 
from tobacco products, and since 2005, from the war-torn Sudan. Pension 
funds are within their fiduciary duty to divest these stocks from their port-
folio (Board of Trustees vs. City of Baltimore 317 Md. 72,562, A.2d 720 [1989]) 
and state legislatures are increasingly making such demands. By 2007, eigh-
teen U.S. state legislatures had called for their state pension funds to divest 
from companies doing business in Sudan.11 
Three initiatives highlight the influence investors have internationally: 
CDP, UNEP PRI, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
The CDP asks institutional investors to support a request for greater corpo-
rate disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions. As of February 2007 this initiative 
had signatories representing $41 trillion of assets globally (Carbon Disclosure 
Project 2007). The influence of this initiative is being felt by corporations be-
cause of the greater transparency requirements and the need for increased 
Fig. 1.4 Growth of emerging market market equity assets 
of the top two hundred U.S. pension funds (billions) 
Source: Pensions and Investments (2007). 
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sensitivity to their impact on global climate change. The newly formed UN 
PRI (2007), with signatories representing $8 trillion of assets, proposes a set 
of guidelines for investors seeking to advance long-term sustainable global 
markets. Meanwhile the EITI calls for greater transparency in the global ex-
tractive industries with a particular emphasis on reducing bribery in emerging 
markets around the world. All three initiatives are new, global, represent large 
coalitions, and address the social and environmental concerns of institutional 
investors. All three initiatives seek greater transparency from corporations 
and use corporate engagement as their preferred form of interaction. These 
initiatives are part of pension funds long-term investment strategies and are 
prime examples of pension fund corporate engagement at work. 
Given the growing power of pension fund international investment flows, 
it is little wonder that global activists see pension funds as potential points of 
leverage to reach global equity and social justice goals. A new generation of 
international activists is drawing the world's attention to the deepening divide 
between developed and developing nations and more explicitly, the growing 
gap between the world's wealthy and the world's poor. The protests against 
the World Trade Organization, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund 
in the late 1990s showed that many believed the goals of social justice, equality, 
human rights, labor rights, and environmental standards to be unattainable 
in the rush to serve the needs of global capital.12 However, since 2002 there 
has been a growing realization that global capital flows can indeed become a 
useful tool if investment is harnessed to meet demands for sustainability and 
global social justice. 
Much as we saw during the anti-apartheid divestment campaign of the 
1970s and 1980s, the line between long-term financial benefit and social action 
is being blurred by global pressure to respond to social justice issues around 
the world. Chapter 5 provides evidence from CalPERS' emerging market 
screening that backs this claim. 
Corporate Engagement Typology 
There is a hierarchy of steps through which most pension funds progress as 
they engage corporations. These steps range from the simplest and easiest 
activities to the most complex and contentious. Typically it takes pension 
funds a number of years of active ownership to work through all ten steps 
(see table 1.1). 
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Table I. I Ten steps of corporate engagement 
1. Develop policy statement 
2. Identify areas of major concern in corporate governance, 
environmental and/or social conduct. 
3. Develop proxy voting guidelines and vote proxies in a manner that 
addresses concern. 
4. Take membership in coalitions of institutional investors. 
5. Where relevant, include formal codes of governance, social and envi-
ronmental conduct that address these concerns in proxy voting 
guidelines. 
6. Engage company officials on extra-financial issues identified above. 
7. Consider extra-financial factors in investment selection and monitoring. 
8. Consider extra financial factors in fund management selection and 
monitoring. 
9. Relationship investing. 
10. Propose minority shareholder resolutions and develop Focus Lists. 
To be successful both the pension fund board of trustees and its senior 
management must agree to undertake corporate engagement. Each must 
understand its impact on long-term investments. Without the commitment 
of both sets of key actors, corporate engagement can become a mere box-
ticking activity by fund managers, rather than a way to use owners' influence 
to raise the environmental, social, and governance standards of companies. 
This box-ticking tendency was evident in the United Kingdom, where gov-
ernment legislation requires pension funds to say whether and to what extent 
they use environmental, social, and ethical standards in investment decision 
making. With the advent of the legislation in 2000, few pension funds wanted 
to be excluded. Sixty percent of UK funds indicate they used these standards 
to judge investment (Mathieu 2000). However, when asked how they used 
them, over two-thirds replied that they instructed their fund managers to take 
these aspects of the firm into consideration to the extent that it did not impact 
immediate shareholder value. 
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Table 1.1 details the steps most pension funds progress through as they 
engage corporations. In order to begin the process of engagement pension 
funds take the first step of establishing a policy statement that guides their 
activity. These statements or policies are developed at the board level of the 
fund. They are often referred to as policies of responsible investment and are 
part of the overall statement of investment principles that guide the fund. 
Such statements are further refined in step two of pension fund corporate 
engagement. Here pension funds identify the area of corporate behavior they 
are seeking to change through engagement. Research indicates that most pen-
sion funds identify corporate governance issues when they begin the process 
of engaging corporations. This area is natural for pension fund investors, as 
all shareholders have legal rights that allow them input into the governance 
of corporations. In 2007, many activist pension funds sought a "say on pay" 
and engaged corporations on the compensation offered senior management. 
For the first time a "say on pay" shareholder proposal won majority support 
at a publicly owned U.S. company when 50 percent of shareholders voted to 
have future compensation packages at Verizon submitted to a non-binding 
shareholder vote.13 
It is important to note that several research studies including one by Har-
vard Business School link strong standards of corporate governance with 
positive financial performance over time (Gompers et al. 2003). 
Standard areas of behavior identified by pension funds for corporate 
engagement include greater accountability measures such as the separation 
of board chair from CEO, limits on executive compensation, and nomination 
of board members. They also incorporate greater transparency from corpo-
rations on social and environmental issues. Chapter 3 examines the increasing 
shift toward transparency demands in pension fund corporate engagement, 
while chapters 4 and 5 detail investors' interest in the social and environmental 
standards of corporate behavior. 
Once the pension fund has decided to consistently vote its proxies 
according to the issues identified in step two, they develop proxy-voting guide-
lines to govern this activity. This is the third step in pension fund corporate 
engagement. U.S. pension funds are required by law to vote their proxies, 
which are seen as a plan asset under ERISA legislation. Although voting 
proxies is the easiest form of corporate engagement, until 2001 most pension 
funds and other institutional investors voted their proxies in accordance with 
management's wishes. The downturn in the market in 2001 provided a wake-
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up call to investors. Pension fund investors began to develop detailed guide-
lines for voting their proxies and increasingly contract proxy-voting services 
that both advise pension funds and vote their proxies according to these 
guidelines. Such guidelines cover a range of corporate governance issues. 
Although social and environmental issues are often dealt with on a case-by-
case basis, several large pension funds have developed proxy-voting guidelines 
that cover these issues. Many pension funds now post both their proxy-voting 
guidelines and voting records on their websites to provide greater trans-
parency in their own governance mechanisms. 
As detailed throughout this book one of the most important shifts in pen-
sion fund corporate engagement is the newly found willingness of funds to 
work together. Once the pension fund has decided to become active owners 
they seek out others concerned with similar issues (step four in table 1.1). 
Many pensions funds are restricted in how much of their own portfolio can 
be in a single holding, as a result they usually hold at most 1 to 2 percent of 
their own portfolio in any given large public company. CalPERS is no excep-
tion. It holds close to $2 billion in General Electric (GE) stock and debt, which 
for the $245 billion pension fund is its largest holding (as of December 2006). 
For GE this figure represents only .5 percent of total market capitalization. 
GE's primary concern lies with satisfying the other 99.5 percent of their share-
holders. When pension funds and other institutional investors act in concert, 
however, they can represent upward of 10 percent or more of a company's 
holdings. It is at this point that corporate engagement becomes a potent force. 
Coalitions on corporate governance issues include the U.S. Council of Insti-
tutional Investors and the International Corporate Governance Network. 
Increasingly coalitions of institutional investors have formed on a number of 
social and environmental concerns, such as the Institutional Investors on Cli-
mate Risk, the CDP, the EITI and the signatories to the UN PRI. 
In step five, pension fund investors integrate formal codes of behavior 
adopted by coalitions such as the OECD Codes of Corporate Governance or 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the CERES Environmental Stan-
dards, the Global Sullivan Principles, or the McBride Principles into their 
proxy-voting guidelines. As a result, when a minority shareholder resolution 
calls for a company to adopt these codes of conduct, the pension funds vote 
in favor of the resolution if the code is relevant to the companies business. 
Once pension funds are actively voting their proxies and participating in 
coalitions, they begin to engage companies directly (step six). This type of 
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engagement is usually done through private channels and is therefore hard to 
quantify. Phone calls, letters, and private meetings are all employed as pen-
sion fund investors express concern with senior corporate management on 
issues they believe could have a negative impact on long-term shareholder 
value. Most of what is known about this type of engagement is anecdotal with 
either corporate executives or pension fund officials revealing these interac-
tions. Such engagement is not designed to inflict reputational damage on the 
corporation, but rather to privately convey concerns to management with the 
hope that the latter will respond voluntarily to the request from a significant 
shareholder or group of shareholders. Research indicates that when the share-
holder is large and influential with significant holdings in the company, 
management is more likely to respond positively to such engagement. 
Ultimately in order for such quiet engagement to work there must be some 
threat from shareholders if the company refuses to change its behavior. Such 
threats are usually to the reputation of the company. In most cases senior 
management fear negative publicity and will often engage rather than run the 
risk that investors will use the media or mount a dissident shareholder cam-
paign to achieve the changes they are seeking. 
Generally pension fund investors want to avoid negative publicity, as they 
do not want to drive down the value of their shareholding but rather to raise 
the standard of corporate behavior. This is in contrast to socially responsible 
investors who seek public attention and often mount minority shareholder 
campaigns based on small amounts of holdings and no initial engagement 
with the corporation. These investors often use their ownership position to 
inflict reputational damage even at the expense of shareholder value. For them 
the change in corporate behavior is a more important goal than long-term 
share value. 
Steps seven and eight—using extra-financial information to select invest-
ments and fund managers—take place only when mainstream investment 
managers accept the importance of extra-financial information in long-term 
share value. To date most mainstream analysts discount the value of extra-
financial data as relevant in investment selection. The investment belief that 
all information about a firm is already known and incorporated in its current 
market price is strongly held by both internal and external pension fund 
money managers and is the view most often taught in business schools around 
the world. In order to successfully move to steps seven and eight there must 
be a systematic integration of the importance of extra-financial investment 
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criteria to the pension fund. This means that responsible investing managers 
are not public affairs officers, but rather are fully integrated in the investment 
decision making of the pension fund. It also means benchmarking and finan-
cial incentives for both internal and external money managers must be geared 
to long-term rather than short-term investment horizons. 
As with standard financial information, money managers rely on rating 
agencies to provide them with extra-financial ratings of corporate behavior. 
In addition to small boutique rating agencies, mainstream agencies such as 
Standard and Poor's, Moody's and Fitch are providing extra-financial ratings 
for companies' environmental, social, and governance standards. The EAI is 
an example of institutional investors valuing such extra-financial informa-
tion. Signatories to the EAI agree to set aside 5 percent of their trading 
commissions for analysts who use extra-financial information in their invest-
ment selection process.14 By May of 2007 the EAI had members representing 
$2.4 trillion in assets. 
Step nine is termed relationship investing. Here pension funds move 
beyond simple requests for transparency, disclosure, and factoring extra-
financial indicators into investment selection. With relationship investing the 
investor is prepared to hold a significant stake in the company, usually greater 
than 10 percent, and often takes one or more board positions as well. Relation-
ship investing requires a positive response from senior management to such 
shareholder engagement. Often the investors' management skills are seen as 
adding value to the company. For most pension funds such a commitment to 
a single investment would require more due diligence than they are prepared 
to make. However, we are seeing specialized investment vehicles (e.g., San 
Diego-based company Relational Investing) adopt this approach with their 
investment portfolio. Pension funds such as CalPERS are major investors in 
this vehicle and have made returns upward of 33 percent since its inception 
in late 2002 to December 2005, outperforming its benchmark by 18 percent 
during that period—a testament to the added value of relationship investing. 
The most contentious stage in corporate engagement is step ten—the 
mounting of minority shareholder resolutions and the development of Focus 
Lists that single out non-complying companies in order to force them to 
change their behavior. With this step shareholders use their position and 
influence to inflict reputational damage on the firm. As a result the pension 
fund investor or coalition of investors is often characterized as a bully. This 
step represents the most significant power shift between managers and 
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owners. Management often resents shareholders' power and becomes intran-
sigent in their position when shareholder resolutions are proposed. 
Minority shareholder campaigns have two desired outcomes. Either the 
resolution is able to garner enough support to pass or at least enough support 
to provide a strong warning to management15 or it generates negative pub-
licity that has an equally galvanizing effect, particularly if the shareholders are 
large institutional investors. In 2007, minority shareholder resolutions calling 
on ExxonMobil to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and Wal-Mart to resolve 
issues of equity compensation to women and employees of color are good 
examples of how minority shareholder resolutions can generate negative pub-
licity for corporations even when they do not pass. If management wants to 
avoid negative publicity they often seek a solution that allows the resolution 
to be withdrawn before it comes to a vote. 
Focus lists identify a group of underperforming companies with serious 
environmental, social, and governance problems. Both CalPERS and the U.S. 
Council of Institutional Investors maintain annual Focus Lists of such firms. 
These lists are designed to generate negative publicity in an effort to change 
corporate behavior. Chapter 3 provides detail on CalPERS' Focus List and 
how it is perceived by the companies it targets. When pension funds and 
other institutional investors use the tools of step ten they aie deeply engaged 
as active owners with the companies in their investment portfolio and are 
prepared to use their position in financial markets to achieve their goals. 
Since 2004, we have begun to see a backlash to shareholder power, partic-
ularly in the United States. According to the Economist, "What corporate 
America is facing is a revolution, the end game of which is management-by-
referendum" (2007,15). Despite early optimism in the years immediately 
following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, active owners have seen corporate gover-
nance power shift back in favor of management One of the starkest examples 
is the slowing of access to the proxy for shareholder-nominated board candi-
dates by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
Conclusion 
Pension fund corporate engagement is a new and unfolding tool that has the 
ability to significantly influence and raise standards of corporate behavior. 
Understanding its origins, drivers, and impacts is important for assessing 
whether this force can indeed match the rhetoric that surrounds it. Chapter 
